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A Report from the Economic Research Service
Abstract
The rapid increase in the number of bilateral and regional free-trade agreements 
since 1995 is a striking development. The proliferation of these agreements has raised 
questions about whether they have, in fact, opened markets, created trade, promoted 
economic growth, and/or distorted trade. This study uses panel data from 1975 to 
2005 and a gravity framework model to identify the inﬂ  uence of reciprocal trade 
agreements (RTAs) on bilateral trade in the world agricultural marketplace. A bench-
mark, Heckman sample-selection and two generalized models, one of which accounts 
for RTA phase-in effects, are used to gauge the impact on partner trade of mutual as 
well as asymmetric RTA membership. Empirical results show that RTAs increase 
agricultural trade between member countries but decrease trade between member and 
nonmember countries. Interestingly, RTAs were found to be particularly effective at 
expanding agricultural trade and opening markets in developing countries when devel-
oping-country trading partners are part of the same agreement.
Keywords: trade policy, reciprocal trade agreements, bilateral, regional, missing 
trade, gravity models.
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Also see the recently released ERS report Selected Trade Agreements and 
Implications for U.S. Agriculture, by John Wainio, Mark Gehlhar, and John Dyck 
(www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err115). This study (ERR-115) uses the comput-
able general equilibrium framework to examine how free trade agreements between 
ASEAN (Southeast Asia) countries and China and Australia/New Zealand, as 
well as pending agreements between the United States and Korea, Colombia, and 
Panama, are likely to affect U.S. agricultural trade. Empirical results ﬁ  nd that trade 
created under these agreements exceeds trade diverted, but that results depend on 
the speciﬁ  c circumstances of each agreement. The RTA study (ERR-113) uses panel 
data and econometric models to examine the impact on partner trade in agriculture 
of all types of bilateral and regional trade agreements in which members agree to 
open their markets to each other’s exports by lowering trade barriers.iii
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Summary
What Is the Issue?
Countries use bilateral/regional trade agreements to increase market access 
and expand trade in foreign markets. These agreements are called recip-
rocal trade agreements (RTAs) because members grant special advantages 
to each other. RTAs include many types of agreements, such as preferential 
arrangements, free trade agreements, customs unions, and common markets, 
in which members agree to open their markets to each other’s exports by 
lowering trade barriers. They have become an increasingly prominent feature 
of the multilateral trading system in recent years, in part, because of stalled 
global negotiations taking place under the auspices of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
Many observers believe that RTAs deepen market integration and comple-
ment efforts by the WTO to liberalize international markets. While acknowl-
edging that RTAs can open up markets, other observers contend that these 
agreements also distort trade and discriminate against nonmember countries. 
Many studies have examined the degree to which RTAs increase trade 
between member countries. Relatively few, however, have attempted to quan-
tify the extent to which RTAs curtail trade between member and nonmember 
countries. In this study, ERS empirically examines the bilateral trade expan-
sion/contraction effects of RTAs in the world agricultural marketplace. 
What Did the Study Find?
•  Model results estimate that RTA membership boosts agricultural trade 
between member countries, on average, between 34 and 93 percent in the 
long run. 
•  The expansion of trade between RTA members typically comes at the 
expense of trade with nonmember countries. Empirical results show that 
agricultural trade falls, on average, between 26 and 46 percent in the long 
run between two countries when one of them does not belong to an RTA 
to which the other is a member.
•  The trade impacts of RTAs grow as producers and consumers adjust to 
policy-induced changes in market structure and as the implementing 
provisions of these agreements are phased in over time. Models that 
account for the cumulative, phase-in effects of RTAs show that, on 
average, agricultural trade increases 105 percent between two trading 
partners that belong to the same agreement in the long run but falls 49 
percent between an RTA member country and a nonmember trading 
partner. 
•  RTAs boost trade in agricultural markets. The percentage increase in 
partner trade expansion induced by mutual RTA membership exceeds 
the percentage decline in partner trade characterizing asymmetric RTA 
membership. iv
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•  RTAs are particularly effective at expanding agricultural trade and 
opening markets in developing countries when both developing-country 
trading partners are members of the same agreement. 
How Was the Study Conducted?
ERS developed econometric models to isolate the impacts of RTAs on bilat-
eral trade in agriculture. Researchers adopted various approaches to control 
for the inﬂ  uence of the many factors affecting bilateral trade, such as the 
capacity of suppliers to export, the size of demand in importing countries, 
transaction costs, and characteristics that induce two countries to trade 
with each other (e.g., differences in resource endowments). The trade data 
deployed in model estimations included bilateral trade ﬂ  ows reported by UN 
Comtrade between 69 countries covering the 1975 to 2005 time frame.
The empirical models identiﬁ  ed statistical regularities, controlled for the 
unique institutional and physical characteristics of each country pair, and 
allowed for dynamic pricing and RTA phase-in effects. They yielded quan-
titative estimates of the impacts on partner trade of mutual and asymmetric 
RTA membership.1
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Introduction
Trade agreements, whether multilateral, regional, or bilateral in scope, are 
policy instruments that can increase market efﬁ  ciency, expand trade, and 
enhance economic welfare of participant countries. Economists hold a partic-
ularly favorable view of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the global 
organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations, and its prede-
cessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT/
WTO provides an international forum to supervise and liberalize trade 
worldwide and to ensure that trade ﬂ  ows as freely as possible. The guiding 
principle is open and free trade enunciated in the WTO’s most-favored-nation 
(MFN) clause. The granting of MFN status means that a country should not 
discriminate among trading partners. 
Acceptable rules and regulations of bilateral/regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) are identiﬁ  ed in Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO. This Article 
establishes conditions governing cross-border barriers both within bilateral/
regional trade agreements and between bilateral/regional-trade-agreement 
members and nonmembers. One condition eliminates or removes trade 
barriers on “substantially all the trade” within bilateral/regional trade agree-
ments. Another prohibits member countries from raising trade barriers 
against non-member countries above their pre-agreement levels.
Since the Annecy Round in 1949, the GATT/WTO has progressively reduced 
trade barriers in the world marketplace. Agriculture, however, was largely 
exempt from the trade-liberalizing rules that applied to most products under 
the GATT; that is, until the Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement (URAA) 
in 1994. Still, many countries continue to use a variety of instruments to 
protect domestic agriculture and to curtail imports of agricultural goods in 
the post-URAA era. Examples include special safeguards, special and differ-
ential treatment for developing countries, relatively high tariffs, and compara-
tively modest access within tariff-rate quotas.
The Doha Round of the WTO was launched in 2001 with the aim of further 
opening up agricultural markets and increasing exporter access to both devel-
oped and developing country markets. However, no tangible breakthrough 
has been achieved after 9 years of negotiations. Stalled multilateral talks have 
provided opportunities for some countries to reduce trade barriers via recip-
rocal trade agreements (RTAs). These agreements arise when members agree 
to open their markets to each other’s exports by lowering trade barriers. They 
can take various forms, such as preferential arrangements, free trade agree-
ments, customs unions, and common markets.
RTAs have become an increasingly prominent feature of the multilateral 
trading system in recent years. According to the WTO, there were 186 such 
agreements in force in 2005, up from 50 just prior to the Uruguay Round in 
1994, less than 25 in 1985, and just 13 agreements in 1975 (ﬁ  g. 1).1 As the 
number of agreements expanded, the RTA share of world trade rose from 22 
percent in 1975 to over 50 percent in 2005.
Some economists believe that RTAs can be powerful forces promoting 
market liberalization that not only complement, but go beyond, multilateral 
1According to the WTO’s Committee 
on Regional Trade Agreements 
(CRTA), as of July 31, 2010, there are 
a total of 474 bilateral/regional trade 
agreements in force (World Trade 
Organization, 2010).2
Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Impacts on Bilateral Trade Expansion and Contraction in the World Agricultural Marketplace / ERR-113
Economic Research Service/USDA
trade efforts in the WTO to open international markets (Bergsten, 1998). 
While the WTO has progressively lowered tariffs worldwide, it has made 
little progress addressing other trade barriers, such as food safety concerns, 
domestic regulations, and incompatible technical standards. Harmonization 
of nontariff barriers is a source of trade and welfare gains of RTAs. For 
example, negotiations leading to the establishment of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) addressed many contentious issues inhib-
iting trade. One result of these discussions was the removal import-licensing 
requirements for grapes in Mexico. The lifting of these requirements 
increased U.S. grape exports (Zahniser et al., 2004). 
Other economists are less convinced about the positive effects of bilateral/
regional trade agreements. They acknowledge that the formation and growth 
of RTAs can foster trade liberalization, deepen economic integration, and 
generate economic opportunities, but they also express concerns that these 
agreements can distort trade, increase discrimination against nonmember 
countries, and lower overall economic welfare (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 
1996; Fiorentino et al., 2006). 
Trade theory does not provide a deﬁ  nitive answer as to whether RTAs 
enhance economic welfare. Increases in partner trade of RTA members may 
be beneﬁ  cial whenever production shifts toward the most efﬁ  cient producers 
of speciﬁ  c goods within the trading bloc. Consumers are better off in coun-
tries belonging to a bilateral/regional trade agreement when they substitute 
lower priced imported goods from RTA partners for higher priced domestic 
goods. But while RTAs often increase trade among partner countries, 
they may also discriminate and favor relatively high-cost member-country 
suppliers at the expense of more efﬁ  cient nonmember suppliers.
The impacts of RTAs on the direction and ﬂ  ow of agricultural trade in the 
world marketplace depend not just upon trade expansion within member 
blocs but also on trade contraction between RTA and non-RTA members, 
a byproduct of these agreements. In this study, we empirically examine the 
Figure 1
Growth in bilateral/regional trade agreements (RTAs) and their prominence in global markets
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effects on bilateral trade of RTAs in agriculture using Viner/Meade’s notions 
of trade creation and trade diversion.
According to Viner (1950), trade creation arises when RTAs induce shifts 
from domestic to partner country sources of supply. He posits that trade 
expansion occurs because low-cost products from producers in member coun-
tries displace high-cost domestic products. Trade diversion occurs, according 
to Viner, when RTAs trigger a shift in the source of production from 
nonmember suppliers to member countries. This happens when bloc partners 
reorient their imports away from low-cost, nonmember countries toward 
higher cost, member countries. Meade (1956) elaborated on Viner’s produc-
tion-oriented explanation to include RTA’s effects on consumption. Meade 
points out that even if production in two countries belonging to the same RTA 
does not change, both countries may gain because lower prices enable their 
citizens to consume more of the goods for which they express a preference.
Applied research is needed to clarify the economic tradeoffs of bilateral/
regional trade agreements. To date, most econometric studies have focused on 
quantifying the extent to which mutual RTA membership has expanded trade. 
Relatively few studies have examined how asymmetric RTA membership may 
also have lowered trade. 
In this study, the primary objective of ERS is to empirically examine the 
impacts of RTAs on bilateral trade in agriculture where restrictive domestic 
and border policies continue to pose signiﬁ  cant impediments to free and open 
trade. We use the gravity framework and panel data to quantify the degree 
to which these agreements have affected partner trade, both positively and 
negatively. 4
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Econometric Models
Clearly, many economic forces besides the establishment of bilateral/regional 
free-trade agreements shape the direction and volume of trade in the global 
market. When attempting to empirically isolate the ex-post impact of RTAs, it 
is, therefore, important to control for the many other determinants affecting 
partner trade. The gravity framework, which can account for myriad inﬂ  u-
ences, is well suited to identify how these agreements shape cross-border 
trade.2 See the appendix for a summary of advances in applied analyses and 
theoretical linkages underlying the gravity framework.
The gravity framework has been widely used in applied research to assess the 
RTA impacts on trade between member countries. For example, the following 
studies have deployed the commonly used RTA dummy variable—deﬁ  ned 
as equaling one when both the exporter and importer are members of the 
same agreement, and zero otherwise: Aitken, 1973; Sapir, 2001; Rose and 
van Wincoop, 2001; Cheng and Wall, 2005; Vollrath et al., 2006; Sandberg 
et al., 2006; Eicher and Henn, 2009; Subramanian and Wei, 2007; Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2007; Baier et al., 2008; Grant and Lambert, 2008a. 
Soloaga and Winters (2001) developed a model designed to control for rela-
tive openness of RTA member countries with the objective of removing the 
potential bias in intrabloc coefﬁ  cients. The gravity equations used in their 
study (as well as in studies by Clarete et al., 2003, and Lambert and McKoy, 
2009) include dummy variables to denote mutual RTA membership as well 
as two dummy variables to control for systematic openness of RTA members, 
one for the exporter and one for the importer. The exporter openness dummy 
equals one should the exporter be a member of a designated RTA regard-
less of the status of the importing country. The importer openness dummy 
is deﬁ  ned similarly. It equals one should the importing country belong to an 
RTA, regardless of the status of the exporting country. 
In addition to estimating the intrabloc effects on unidirectional trade ﬂ  ows, 
applied research has been used to determine whether trade agreements 
increase two-way trade, advance trade liberalization, and/or lead to market 
distortions. Eichengreen and Irwin (1995); Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997); 
Wei and Frankel (1997); and Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) sought to determine 
whether individual RTAs were open or closed trading blocs in models where 
the dependent variable was the “sum of exports and imports.” Rose (2004) 
and Tomz et al. (2007) addressed whether trade agreements increase the 
“average value of bilateral trade,” using dummy variables to denote mutual 
membership in these agreements. Vicard (2009) examined whether different 
types of RTAs (i.e., preferential arrangements, free trade agreements, custom 
unions, and common markets) affect “total bilateral trade” differentially. 
Several studies have developed models designed explicitly to estimate both 
trade creation and trade diversion. Endoh (1999) developed a model that 
focused on the European Economic Community, the Latin American Free 
Trade Association, and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. Tang 
(2005) directed attention to NAFTA, the Closer Economic Relations trade 
agreement between Australia and New Zealand, and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) trade agreement. Koo et al. (2006) 
2One reviewer expressed skepti-
cism that any useful information could 
be generated from highly aggregate 
gravity models.  Our view is that 
applied research is needed across 
numerous levels of aggregation if 
economists are to provide information 
about economic relationships that can 
be helpful to policymakers and can help 
educate the public.  It is important to 
be able to generalize about the effect 
of policy instruments, such as bilat-
eral/regional trade agreements, on the 
patterns of world trade and economic 
welfare.  It is also important to gain 
insight about the impact of such policy 
instruments on individual sectors, 
commodities, periods, and speciﬁ  c 
agreements.  Additional research is 
needed that focuses attention on the 
impacts of speciﬁ  c agreements on trade 
in agriculture, both at the sector level 
and across individual commodities and 
also on the impacts of RTAs on exports 
(imports) of individual countries.5
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focused attention on the European Union, NAFTA, the ASEAN, and the 
Andean Community. Magee (2008) and Vollrath et al. (2009) developed 
generic indexes to quantify overall trade creation and trade diversion. All of 
the gravity model studies enumerated here, with the exception of Tang and 
Magee, were estimated using cross-sectional data.3 
The use of panel, rather than cross-sectional data, is generally preferred, 
especially in a gravity model incorporating RTA dummy variables. In cross-
sectional estimates, the RTA dummies account for everything speciﬁ  c to the 
bilateral pairs not captured by the invariant ﬁ  xed effects (e.g., distance) speci-
ﬁ  ed in the model. As a result, the RTA dummies in such models do not really 
isolate the trade-creation and trade-diversion effects. Panel-based models also 
offer a better opportunity to account for changes (e.g., changes in income) 
taking place within and between countries over time. Moreover, they generate 
more efﬁ  cient parameter estimates. Importantly, they enable the researcher 
to enrich model speciﬁ  cation with ﬁ  xed effects that mitigate omitted-variable 
and heterogeneity bias, which more effectively isolates the impacts of RTAs. 
In this study, ERS uses panel data and information about mutual and asym-
metric RTA membership to estimate gravity models that contain generic RTA 
indices designed to approximate Viner/Meade’s trade creation and trade 
diversion effects in the global marketplace.4 The binary mutual-agreement 
index (MA) takes a value of one whenever two countries jointly belong to the 
same RTA, otherwise MA equals zero. The asymmetric-agreement index 
(AA) takes a value of one whenever the exporter is not a member of an RTA 
to which the importer belongs and zero otherwise. A positive and statistically 
signiﬁ  cant MA coefﬁ  cient indicates that bilateral trade between two countries 
belonging to the same RTA increases as a result of the removal of tariffs and 
nontariff restrictions. A negative and signiﬁ  cant AA coefﬁ  cient indicates that 
imports by an RTA member from a nonmember falls as a result of asym-
metric membership. 
MA and AA capture, respectively, bilateral trade expansion and trade contrac-
tion in the global marketplace due to RTAs. They do not measure the welfare 
effects of these agreements, for such effects depend not only on the amount 
of trade created and diverted but also on relative efﬁ  ciencies or differences 
in unit costs. As noted in Palgrave (1987), trade creation increases economic 
welfare when higher cost domestic sources of supply are replaced by lower 
cost imports from partner countries that had been constrained by tariffs 
and nontariff barriers. Trade diversion has a welfare cost when trade-policy 
discrimination against nonmember countries leads to the replacement of 
lower cost sources of supply in these countries by higher cost partner country 
sources.
We estimate two conventional and two generalized gravity models using 
ﬁ  xed effects.5  The conventional models are based upon commonly used 
benchmark equations as well as Heckman’s sample-selection framework. 
The generalized models are structured to conform to Anderson and van 
Wincoop’s (2003; 2004) analytical framework. The ﬁ  rst generalized model 
is a dummy-intensive ﬁ  xed-effects model that incorporates exporter-by-time, 
importer-by-time, and export-import pair dummies. The second includes 
the same set of ﬁ  xed effects as the ﬁ  rst, but adds RTA phase-in variables 
to complement the contemporaneous RTA variable. To address the issue of 
3The trade-diversion variables used 
in the Tang and Magee studies equal 
one when either country i or j belongs 
to an RTA.  These dummies depart 
from Viner’s concept of trade diver-
sion in that Viner restricted attention 
to imports by an RTA member country 
from a nonmember supplier.
4Other studies that have used generic 
RTA indexes in a panel setting include 
Rose (2006), Tomz et al. (2007), 
Subramanian and Wei (2007), Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007), and Grant and 
Lambert (2008a).  But these indexes 
have been restricted to portray trade 
creation, not trade diversion.
  5A reviewer asked why we never 
tried random-effects estimation.  We did 
not use this approach, as others have 
rejected it for theoretical and empirical 
reasons.  Baier et al. (2008) reject using 
the random-effects model in gravity 
analyses on conceptual grounds.  They 
point out that unobserved time-invariant 
variables inﬂ  uence both the presence of 
RTAs as well as the volume of trade.  In 
the ﬁ  xed-effects model, these unobserv-
able variables are controlled by using 
country-pair ﬁ  xed effects.  The problem 
with the random-effects model is that 
it assumes zero correlation between 
these bilateral ﬁ  xed effects and RTAs.  
Moreover, Egger (2000) tested for ﬁ  xed 
versus random effects after estimating 
gravity equations with panel data.  
Using the Hausman test, he found 
overwhelming empirical evidence for 
the rejection of random-effects gravity 
model relative to a ﬁ  xed-effects model.6
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heterogeneity of partner trade, we ran the generalized model not only on the 
global sample of bilateral trade ﬂ  ows between 69 countries but also on eight 
subsamples, consisting of various combinations of developed and developing 
countries exporting and importing from each other.
The benchmark model
The basic gravity framework using panel data relates exports by country i to 
country j in year t to the market size of both countries in year t and economic 
distance or trade costs separating the two countries. In our conventional 
gravity models, we follow the literature and use Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) to quantify market size. The time-varying GDP of the exporting 
country, (Yit), represents the potential supply of goods from that country. The 
GDP of the importing country, (Yjt), reﬂ  ects the potential demand of the 
goods being traded.6 Since data on trade costs are not readily available, our 
basic model includes observable variables to reﬂ  ect different aspects of bilat-
eral trade costs, namely transportation costs, cultural proximity, and partner 
trade policies.
Our benchmark gravity equation takes the following form:
  ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ( ) ijt t it jt ijt ij ij 01 2 1 2 3 121 2 )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 3 ) CB ( 3 i ( 3 ) βββ l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) 01 2 1 2 121 2 121 2 01 2 1 2 21 2 121 2 121 2 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) )l ( )l ()l ( ln( ) ln( ) 01 2 1 2 21 2 121 2 121 2 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) 01 2 1 2 21 2 21 2 121 121 2 01 2 1 2 21 2 121 2 21 2 121 121 2
45 6 7                   ( ) ( )   ( ) ( )                      (1) ij ij ij ijt ijt LL LS CH TP ββ β βε +++ ++
factor endowments are captured by (FEijt), a measure of exporter-to-importer 
arable-land/total-labor ratios in year t. The indicators for transportation costs 
include physical distance (DTij) and two dummy variables to reﬂ  ect 
geographical adjacency, (CBij) which equals 1 when i and j share a contig-
uous border and 0 otherwise and landlockedness (LLij), which equals 1 when 
either i or j are landlocked and 0 otherwise. The measures for cultural prox-
imity include language similarity (LSij) a dummy variable which equals 1 
whenever 9 percent or more of the population in both countries share a 
common language and 0 otherwise;7 and colonial heritage (CHij), a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if two countries have established colonial ties since 
1945 and 0 otherwise.8 Time dummies (γt) account for factors common to all 
countries, including worldwide inﬂ  ation, increases in trade attributable to 
globalization, and general shocks affecting the world economy.9 We include 
two dummy variables to represent domestic trade policies (TPijt) in each 
model type: (1) a dummy variable denoting mutual membership in RTAs 
(MAijt), which equals 1 in year t when two trading partners are both 
members of the same bilateral/regional trade agreement and 0 otherwise; 
and/or (2) a dummy variable denoting asymmetric membership in these 
agreements (AAijt), which equals 1 in year t when i is not a member of an 
RTA to which j belongs and 0 otherwise.10 
Most gravity models are speciﬁ  ed in log-linear terms because of ease of 
calculation and interpretation. This speciﬁ  cation is not, however, without its 
problems. Taking logarithms often removes observations from the sample 
because the log of zero is undeﬁ  ned. Omitting zero-ﬂ  ow or missing observa-
tions implies that information is lost on the causes of no or very low trade. 
Moreover, the practice of dropping observations may produce downwardly 
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. Consequently, the dependent 
6A reviewer expressed concern 
that the GDP variables in our model 
may induce endogeneity.  Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) addressed this issue, 
as well as other possible sources of 
endogeneity, in gravity equations.  
They contend that while GDP is a func-
tion of total exports and total imports, 
the inclusion of country i’s income 
and country j’s income as independent 
variables in gravity equations is not a 
likely cause of endogeneity because 
each importer has many suppliers and 
each exporter sends its goods to many 
destination markets.  
7The 9-percent threshold serves to 
denote the level at which the ability to 
communicate is viewed as not imposing 
substantial transaction costs. 
8Rose identiﬁ  es four types of dummy 
variables that can be used to control for 
colonial heritage in gravity models: (1) 
a binary variable which is unity if i and 
j were ever colonies after 1945 with the 
same colonizer, (2) a binary variable 
which is unity if i is a colony of j at 
time t or vice versa, (3) a binary vari-
able which is unity if i ever colonized j 
or vice versa, and (4) a binary variable 
is unity if i and j remained part of the 
same nation during the sample.  We 
arbitrarily chose the ﬁ  rst type of binary 
variable to depict colonial heritage in 
our models.
9The  γt = 1 when year is equal to 
t and 0 otherwise, where t = 1975, 
1980,……2005.
10The two RTA dummies were 
constructed using “full-year” enforce-
ment, with full year referring to at least 
8 months of agreement implementation. 7
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variable in gravity models estimated using samples where no trade is 
recorded for some export-to-import partners is no longer bilateral trade; 
rather, it is bilateral trade contingent on the existence of trading relationships. 
The Heckman model
Heckman’s (1979) sample-selection model offers a theoretically sound and 
econometrically elegant way to include zero ﬂ  ows in models of bilateral trade 
(Linders and de Groot, 2006).11 The sample selection gravity model allows 
for the correlation between (1) the joint decision of whether i chooses to 
export to j and j chooses to import from i and (2) the amount, if any, of unidi-
rectional trade between i and j. In other words, this model accounts for the 
relationship between expected proﬁ  tability and conditional expected trade. A 
“selection equation” is used to incorporate the binary decision of whether or 
not to trade based on expected proﬁ  tability. Then, an “outcome equation” 
determines the volume of bilateral trade. 
To circumvent problems associated with zero trade ﬂ  ows, we estimate 
conventional gravity equations using Heckman’s sample-selection framework. 
We chose the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), as research has shown 
that MLE is preferred over the Heckman two-step estimator to jointly esti-
mate the selection and outcome equations (Martin and Pham, 2008). 
Formally, the Heckman model distinguishes between the selection and 
outcome processes:
  s*
ij = zijδ + vij (selection mechanism)
  yij = xijβ+ μij (outcome mechanism)
where zij and xij are the vectors of variables affecting the selection and 
outcome mechanisms, respectively; s* is the underlying latent variable repre-
senting the decision whether to trade (s is observed to be 1 if trade occurs and 
0 otherwise); y is the log of trade when trade occurs (s = 1); and the µ and  
errors are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with correlation ρ. 
The expected value of y, given that it is observed, is
   E[ y | s = 1 ] = xβ + ρλ(zδ)
where λ(zδ) is the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR).12 
The ﬁ  rst set of covariates in the sample-selection model determine the prob-
ability of whether the two countries engage in trade. The second set of covari-
ates determines the intensity of bilateral trade, conditional on the existence of 
a trade relationship. MLE estimation allows for the probability of trade and 
the size of potential trade to be explained jointly.
Our sample-selection model for bilateral agricultural trade is speciﬁ  ed as 
follows:
11Linders and de Groot (2006) 
investigated other methods for dealing 
with zero-trade ﬂ  ows, including 
various extensions of Tobit estimation, 
truncated regression, probit regression, 
and replacement of zero ﬂ  ows with 
arbitrary numbers.  They found the 
sample-selection model econometri-
cally preferable to these alternative 
approaches.
12OLS parameter estimates are likely 
to be downwardly biased and incon-
sistent should incidental truncation 
arise (ρ ≠ 0).  In such situations, the 
OLS regression is misspeciﬁ  ed as it 
excludes the Inverse Mills Ratio as an 
independent variable.  As a result, OLS 
coefﬁ  cients are attenuated (i.e., biased 
toward zero) and the error variance 
(σ2
U) is underestimated.8
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The selection equation
* ln( ) ln( ) ( ) ln( ) ln( )
*
ijt t it jt ijt ij ij 01 2 3 4 5 12 3 4 ln( ) ln( ) ( ) ln( ) ln( ln( ) ln( ) ( ) ln( ) ln( 01 2 3 4 5 234 12 3 4
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where 
  sijt = 1 if s*
ijt > 0
  sijt = 0 if s*
ijt ≤ 0 
The outcome equation13 
* ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
*
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* ln( 5 ln( 5 ) βββ β β β β l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) 01 2 3 4 12 3 4 12 3 4 01 2 3 4 23 4 12 3 4 12 3 4 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) )l ( ) l ()l ( ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) 01 2 3 4 23 4 12 3 4 23 4 12 3 4 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) 01 2 3 4 23 4 23 4 12 3 12 3 4 01 2 3 4 23 4 12 3 4 23 4 12 3 12 3 4
6       ln( )   ( ) ( )                    (3)   ij ij ijt ijt 78 7 ββ β μ 6 ln( )  ( ) ( ) ln( )  ( ) ( ) 6 ijt 78 7 7 () 78 7 7 7 ( 78 7 7 7 )( ) ( )( ) ( () ) ) ln( 6 )( ) ( )( ) ( () () 78 7 7 7 7 ( 78 7 7 7 7  
where
 ( µijt, νijt) – bivariate normal [0,0,1,σ2
 υ, ρvμ]
The generalized gravity models
Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW) developed a generalized gravity model 
in which prices play a central equilibrating role. Baier and Bergstrand (BB) 
extended the AvW framework to a panel setting and estimated models that 
controlled for the effects of changes in multilateral prices through time via 
the use of exporter-by-time and importer-by-time ﬁ  xed effects. BB’s gener-
alized gravity model also controls for partner heterogeneity via the use of 
exporter-to-importer ﬁ  xed effects. These country-pair dummies account 
for the whole host of time-invariant dyadic determinants (e.g., the special 
relationship established between Japan and the United States) that mutually 
affect the volume of trade for each partner pair. Baier and Bergstrand also 
developed a model that includes RTA lags in order to gauge the phase-in 
effects of these agreements on member countries’ trade over time. 
Generalized gravity models address the concerns about proper speciﬁ  cation 
identiﬁ  ed earlier. Following AvW and BB, the ﬁ  rst such model we estimate is 
as follows: 
       ln( ) ( )                                      (4) ijt ij it jt ijt ijt 01 )( ) X ) ijt) β () () ij it jt ijt 01 () () 01 ( ) () ( 01 ( 01
where γit denotes exporter-by-time ﬁ  xed effects, γjt signiﬁ  es importer-by-time 
ﬁ  xed effects, and γij represents exporter-to-importer ﬁ  xed effects.14 Equation 
(4) does not include either ln(Yit) or ln(Yit), as these regressors are absorbed 
by γit and γit, respectively. Similarly, speciﬁ  c dyadic variables, such as 
distance and contiguity, are absorbed by γij. 
Equation (4) overcomes many of the shortcomings of conventional gravity 
models. The country-by-time dummies control for multilateral resistances à 
13To circumvent a possible identiﬁ  ca-
tion problem, we followed common 
practice by excluding an exogenous 
variable in the outcome equation that 
is included in the selection equation.  
One reviewer was critical of our choice 
of dropping the language-similarity 
variable. However, William Greene 
of New York University informed us 
(in personal communication) that the 
identiﬁ  cation restriction was not only 
a “nonissue” when using the MLE, but 
that, if a restriction was imposed, it 
made little difference which variable 
was chosen to exclude from the selec-
tion equation. Moreover, we did not 
estimate the Heckman model in two 
stages, but rather simultaneously, using 
maximum likelihood estimator.  
14γit = 1 for exporter i in year t and 
0 otherwise, γit = 1 for importer j in 
year t and 0 otherwise, and γij = 1 for 
country i exporting to importer j and 0 
otherwise (where i = 1, 2, … 69,  j = 1, 
2, … 69, and t = 1975, 1980 … 2005).  
A reviewer asked why γij did not pick 
up the effects of RTAs.  The answer is 
that the TP indices, unlike the country-
pair ﬁ  xed effects, are not invariant over 
the 31-year time period of the analysis. 
MA and AA are coded dynamically to 
account for the changing composition 
of RTAs through time as countries join/
depart from the speciﬁ  c agreements.9
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la AvW. These dummies not only account for time-varying export and import 
price indexes that inﬂ  uence bilateral trading decisions but also sweep away 
country-speciﬁ  c time-varying effects, such as shifts in domestic policies and 
macroeconomic shocks. The exporter-to-importer dummies provide a way 
to more thoroughly control for cultural and physical heterogeneity among 
country pairs than determinants commonly found in conventional gravity 
models (e.g., distance, contiguity, language similarity, and common colonial 
heritage). 
RTAs typically take time to mature. Their effects on trade cannot, therefore, 
be completely captured with binary variables using the date RTAs entered 
into force. The second generalized model we estimate follows Baier and 
Bergstrand’s framework and incorporates lagged RTA dummies to address 
this problem. This framework includes the same set of ﬁ  xed effects as the 
ﬁ  rst, but adds RTA phase-in variables. 
Our RTA phase-in model includes contemporaneous and lagged RTA dummy 
variables at 5 and 10 years as follows:
ln( ) ( ) ( ) ( )    (5) ijt ij it jt ij t ij t ij t ijt 01 , 2 , 5 3 , 1 0 1, 2, 5 3, )( ) ( ) ( ) )( ) ( ) ( ) )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ij it jt ij t ij t ij t 01 , 2 , 5 3 , 1 0 1, 2, 5 3, 1, 2, 5 ()( )( ) ()( )( ) 01 , 2 , 5 3 , 1 0 ,2 , 5 3 1, 2, 5 3, 1, 2, 5 53 3 53 ) ()( )( )( )( ()( ) ) 10) 01 2 5 3 1 0 25 3 12 5 3 12 5 12 5 ()( )( )( )( ()( ) ()( ) 01 2 5 3 25 3 25 3 12 5 12 5 01 2 5 3 25 3 12 5 3 25 3 12 5 12 5
The lagged variables mitigate measurement errors typically found in gravity 
models that include RTAs as explanatory variables that arise due to the 
inability of contemporaneous 0-1 dummy variables to account for the phase-
in effects of these agreements. In recognition of heterogeneity character-
izing partner trade, equation (5) was run not only on the global sample of 69 
countries trading with each other but also on 8 subsamples, categorized by 
various combinations of high and low per capita incomes of the exporting and 
importing countries.10
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Data
The panel dataset developed for this study includes bilateral trade ﬂ  ows for 
agriculture among 69 countries at 5-year intervals beginning in 1975 and 
ending in 2005.15 Most, but not all, countries export (import) to every other 
country. However, 20 percent of the cells are “missing” in the agricultural 
trade matrix.16 Summary statistics for the variables in the panel dataset are 
shown in table 1.
Bilateral trade data were obtained from the United Nations Commodity Trade 
Statistics (UN Statistical Ofﬁ  ce, 2008) database, UN Comtrade, the primary 
international data source for partner- and product-speciﬁ  c trade that includes 
most countries and products. The WTO’s deﬁ  nition of agriculture is used 
to quantify total agricultural trade. Distances between capital cities and/
or the major commercial center closest to partner countries were calculated 
using the great circle method obtained from USDA’s Agricultural Research 
Service. Data on colonial heritage and landlockedness were obtained from 
Andrew Rose’s (2006) website. Data on language similarity were obtained 
from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(2005) website. Information about arable land was obtained from the United 
Nations Food and Agricultural Organization’s (2008) FAOSTAT database. 
Data on bilateral/regional trade agreements and their date of entry into force 
were compiled by scrutinizing multiple sources, including Oh (2006) and the 
WTO website (see box, “MA and AA: Two Generic RTA Variables Denoting 
Bilateral Trade Policies”).  All other data were obtained from World 
Development Indicators (see World Bank, 2005).
15The 69 countries include Algeria, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Bangladesh, Belgium-Luxembourg, 
Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, 
China (mainland), Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, 
South African Customs Union 
(Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Swaziland), South Korea, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad-Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and 
Zambia.
16We assume that empty cells are due 
to no trade actually having taken place.
The proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements 
i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  r a i s e s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h i s  
phenomenon on agricultural trade in the world marketplace.   
This study examines this phenomenon and gauges its impact 
on partner trade in cases of mutual and asymmetric RTA 
membership using two generic indices.  The MA index is 
used to quantify trade creation characterizing joint RTA 
membership.  The AA index is used to compute trade 
diversion typifying partners when the exporter is not a 
member of an RT A to which the importer belongs.  Both 
measures incorporate the following reciprocal preferential 
arrangements, free-trade agreements, customs unions, and 
common markets: Andean Community, Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia-Singapore 
Agreement, Australia-Thailand Agreement, Canada-Chile 
Agreement, Canada-Costa Rica Agreement, Canada-
Israel Agreement, Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 
Caribbean Community, Central American Common 
Market, Chile-Costa Rica Agreement, Chile-El Salvador 
Agreement, Chile-Israel Agreement, China-Hong Kong 
Agreement, Closer Economic Relations, Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa, European Free Trade 
Agreement (EFTA), EFTA-Chile Agreement, EFTA-Israel 
Agreement, EFTA-Jordan Agreement, EFTA-Mexico 
Agreement, EFTA-Morocco Agreement, EFTA-Poland 
Agreement, EFTA-Singapore Agreement, EFTA-Turkey 
Agreement, European Union (EU), EU-Algeria Agreement, 
EU-Chile Agreement, EU-Egypt Agreement, EU-Israel 
Agreement, EU-Jordan Agreement, EU-Mexico Agreement, 
EU-Morocco Agreement, EU-Norway Agreement, EU-South 
Africa Agreement, EU-Switzerland Agreement, EU-Tunisia 
Agreement, EU-Turkey Agreement, G-3 Free Trade Area, 
Greater Arab Free Trade Area, Gulf Cooperation Council, 
India-Sri Lanka Agreement, Japan-Singapore Agreement, 
Latin American Integration Agreement, MERCOSUR, 
MERCOSUR-Chile Agreement, Mexico-Chile Agreement, 
Mexico-Costa Rica Agreement, Mexico-El Salvador 
Agreement, Mexico-Guatemala Agreement, Mexico-
Honduras Agreement, Mexico-Israel Agreement, Mexico-
Japan Agreement, Mexico-Nicaragua Agreement, New 
Zealand-Singapore Agreement, North American Free Trade 
Agreement, Panama-El Salvador Agreement, Poland-Israel 
Agreement, Poland-Turkey Agreement, South African 
Development Community, South Asian Preferential Trade 
Arrangement, Turkey-Israel Agreement, U.S.-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 
U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement, and the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.
MA and AA: Two Generic RTA Variables Denoting Bilateral Trade Policies 11
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Table 1
Summary statistics for variables in panel dataset
















Relative factor endowment: exporter-to-importer 0.1 hectare of 

















Dummy: 9 percent or more of the population in both countries 












Dummy: asymmetric RTA membership
No. of observations 25,931
1Sample means with standard deviations in parentheses.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.12
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Empirical Findings
Econometric results for the applied gravity models are displayed in tables 
2-6. Tables 2 and 3 contain the statistical results for the benchmark and 
Heckman models. Table 4 presents empirical ﬁ  ndings from the dummy-inten-
sive generalized model focused on contemporaneous RTA variables. Tables 5 
and 6 exhibit statistics from the generalized-gravity models that account for 
contemporaneous as well as RTA phase-in effects. 
Findings from benchmark and Heckman models 
Most parameter estimates in the benchmark models and the Heckman output 
equations are similar in magnitude and statistical signiﬁ  cance (tables 2 and 
3).17 The size of the exporter-income, importer-income, and factor-endow-
ment coefﬁ  cients are virtually identical and statistically signiﬁ  cant at the 0.01 
level in both models. Interestingly, the absolute size of the coefﬁ  cients for 
distance, common border, landlockedness, and colonial heritage are slightly 
smaller in the benchmark than in the Heckman models. By contrast, the MA 
and AA parameter estimates are somewhat larger. Given that incidental trun-
cation was found to characterize agricultural trade in the sample-selection 
model, these results are not surprising.18 They point to parameter bias in log-
linear models due to omitted observations.19 This bias is not, however, severe.
Both models generated correct signs for the basic gravity variables, income 
and distance.  The magnitude of the parameter estimates for these two deter-
minants fall within conventionally acceptable levels. The statistically signiﬁ  -
cant distance elasticities equal -0.78 in the benchmark models and -0.84 in 
the outcome equations of the sample-selection model. The generated income 
elasticities with respect to agricultural trade range from 0.71 for exporters to 
0.79 for importers. The higher elasticity for imports is not unexpected given 
the relatively high demand for food in the developing countries. 
The factor-endowment elasticity with respect to agricultural trade equals 
0.18. The ﬁ  nding of a positive parameter estimate for the exporter-to-importer 
land/labor ratio shows that national resources are an important determinant 
of cross-border trade in agriculture. It provides empirical validation of the 
relevance of economic trade theory and the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) explana-
tion of trade. H-O theory leads one to expect that the uni-directional ﬂ  ow of 
agricultural trade from i and j would be positively related to the relative land/
labor ratio because the production of agricultural goods requires relative 
intensive use of arable land.
Coefﬁ  cients for the invariant dyadic variables—landlockedness, common 
borders, language similarity, and colonial heritage—are statistically signiﬁ  -
cant at the 0.01 level, and each has the hypothesized sign in tables 2 and 3. 
The cost to trade whenever either the exporter or the importer is landlocked 
imposes an ad valorem tax equivalent of 4 to 10 percent, given parameter 
estimates in the benchmark and Heckman models and the assumption that 
the elasticities of substitution range between 5 and 10.20 Sharing a common 
border generates a competitive trade advantage for contiguous partners, 
providing them effectively with an ad valorem subsidy equivalent between 
17The correlation between MA and 
AA is high.  Classic signs of multicol-
linearity arose when both MA and AA 
variables were included in the same 
equation.  The magnitude, sign, and 
statistical signiﬁ  cance of these vari-
ables often changed upon removal of 
either one of them.  To circumvent such 
statistical problems, we ran separate 
equations for (1) trade creation by 
including MA but not AA and (2) trade 
diversion by including AA but not MA.
18Rejection of the null hypothesis 
that ρ = 0 conﬁ  rms the existence of 
correlation between the output and 
selection equations.
19Unfortunately, it was not possible 
to draw inferences about possible 
bias associated with missing observa-
tions and zero trade in our generalized 
gravity models. When attempting to 
apply the Heckman framework to these 
models, the Hessian became unstable, 
precluding convergence. 
20The percentage increase in trade 
attributable to landlockedness in the 
benchmark equation is (eβ5 - 1) x 100.13
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Table 2
Benchmark gravity model (OLS)
Variables Symbols
Coefﬁ  cients










































































Adjusted R2 0.446 0.446 0.446
F-statistic 1,754 1,871 1,852
Root MSE 2.341 2.341 2.341
No. of observations  25,931 25,931 25,931
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of agricultural bilateral trade (lnXijt) from country i to country j in year t.  RTA = reciprocal 
trade agreement.  MA = mutual-agreement index.  AA = Asymmetric-agreement index.  All regressions are estimated using 5-year panel data 
from 1975 to 2005.  Coefﬁ  cient estimates for the ﬁ  xed time effects are not reported for brevity.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  They are 
calculated using White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors.  ** denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.01 level. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.14
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Table 3
Heckman’s sample selection model (MLE) 
Variables Symbols
Coefﬁ  cients
MA and AA MA only AA only


































































































































No. of observations 32,572 32,572 32,572 32,572 32,572 32,572
Censored observations 6,641 6,641 6,641 6,641 6,641 6,641
Log likelihood -70,770 -70,770 -70,772 -70,772 -70,777 -70,777
Wald-statistic 30,454 30,454 30,494 30,494 30,398 30,398
rho ρμ 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
sigma σ 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35
lambda λ 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of agricultural bilateral trade (lnXijt) from country i to country j in year t.  RTA = reciprocal 
trade agreement. MA = mutual-agreement index.  AA = Asymmetric-agreement index.  All regressions are estimated using 5-year panel data 
from 1975 to 2005.  Coefﬁ  cient estimates for the ﬁ  xed time effects are not reported for brevity.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  They are 
calculated using White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors.  ** denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.01 level.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.15
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0.07 and 0.20 percent. However, contiguity was found not to affect the deci-
sion to trade in the selection equations. 
The empirical results show that “cultural distances” matter. Language simi-
larity and colonial heritage have the expected positive sign and are signiﬁ  cant 
at the 1-percent level in the agricultural sector. The ability of a signiﬁ  cant 
proportion of the population in both countries to communicate in the same 
language increases trade relative to other countries between 0.6 and 0.9 
percent, on average. Possession of a colonial heritage also affects the decision 
to trade. Given an afﬁ  rmative decision to trade, the colonial linkage augments 
bilateral trade in agriculture between 3 and 5 percent. 
The benchmark and sample-selection models generated trade policy param-
eters that are similar in magnitude and statistical signiﬁ  cance for each of 
the three speciﬁ  cations. The models that include both MA and AA variables 
provided statistical evidence that RTAs expand trade between member coun-
tries but no evidence that these agreements contract trade from nonmembers. 
However, given the high correlation between the two trade-policy variables, 
multicollinearity causes difﬁ  culty in identifying the separate effects of MA 
and AA. We, therefore, ran separate equations, one excluding the mutual-
agreement and the other excluding the asymmetric-agreement variables. 
Dropping one of the trade policy variables generated parameter estimates of 
the anticipated correct signs that were statistically signiﬁ  cant at the 0.01 level. 
More speciﬁ  cally, the MA coefﬁ  cients fell from 0.82 (0.79) in the MA and 
AA speciﬁ  cation to 0.66 (0.61) in the MA-only benchmark (sample-selection) 
model. In addition, the AA coefﬁ  cients became statistically signiﬁ  cant in 
the two TD-only models, equaling -0.61 in the benchmark and -0.56 in the 
sample-selection models. 
The long-run increase in RTA-induced trade between countries mutually 
belonging to the same agreements was found, on average, to outpace the 
fall in trade characterized by asymmetric membership. Results from the 
MA-only models show that, on average, mutual RTA membership enhances 
partner trade in agriculture between 84 and 93 percent for the benchmark and 
Heckman models, respectively. Similarly, estimates from the AA-only models 
indicate that asymmetrical RTA membership lowers bilateral trade between 
43 and 46 percent when the importer is a member of an RTA to which the 
exporter does not belong.
Findings from the generalized models
The MA and AA coefﬁ  cients were not statistically signiﬁ  cant in the contem-
poraneous generalized gravity model when both trade-policy variables were 
included in the estimating equation (table 4, column 1). However, upon 
purging the equations of severe multicollinearity via the removal of either the 
MA or AA variable, the parameter estimates for both trade-policy variables 
became statistically signiﬁ  cant at the 0.01 level and were of the correct sign 
(table 4, column 2 & 3). Interestingly, the 0.29 coefﬁ  cient for MA and the 
-0.30 coefﬁ  cient for AA are less than half the size of corresponding estimates 
in tables 2 and 3. The lower parameter estimates for the trade-policy vari-
ables indicate that the longrun percentage increase (decrease) in agricultural 
trade due to common (asymmetric) RTA membership is, on average, 34 (26) 16
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percent. The smaller RTA impacts generated by the generalized model are 
due to more comprehensive control of both observed and unobserved hetero-
geneity than in either the benchmark or Heckman models.21 
Table 5 and 6 show the parameter estimates from our RTA phase-in gravity 
models for total agricultural trade. We calculate the sum of the contempora-
neous and lag coefﬁ  cients of MA and AA occurring over 10 years to gauge the 
cumulative impact of RTAs on partner trade as these agreements mature. The 
percentage change in trade expansion and trade contraction are reported as 
“total MA effect” and “total AA effect” when the sum of the parameter esti-
mates MAt + MAt-5 + MAt-10 and AAt + AAt-5 + AAt-10 were determined to be 
signiﬁ  cantly different from zero via Wald test statistics, respectively. 
To examine whether RTAs may have had an impact on various partner 
combinations, we divided our global sample of observed trade ﬂ  ows into 
high-income (HIC), low-income (LIC), and all (ALL) exporter/importer 
groupings. We then ran the dummy-intensive gravity model on the following 
eight subsamples: ALL imports from ALL, HIC imports from ALL, ALL 
imports from HIC, HIC imports from HIC, LIC imports from HIC, LIC 
imports from ALL, ALL imports from LIC, LIC imports from LIC, and HIC 
imports from LIC.
The sum of the generated MA parameter estimates from our global sample 
of 19,225 agricultural trade ﬂ  ows equals 0.72 (table 5, column 1). This 
sum is similar to the 10-year cumulative MA estimates of 0.76 and 0.81, 
denoting trade expansion for total merchandise trade estimated by Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) and for agricultural trade calculated by Grant and Lambert 
(2008), respectively.22 Our estimate indicates that the longrun cumulative 
21These empirical ﬁ  ndings are 
consistent with results elsewhere.  
Magee (2008); Eicher and Henn 
(2009); and Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007) found that the inclusion of 
country-pair ﬁ  xed effects in gravity 
equations lowered RTA parameter 
estimates.
22Neither of these studies addressed 
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Adjusted R2 0.84 0.84 0.84
F-statistic 19.04 19.04 19.04
Root MSE 1.28 1.28 1.28
No. of observations  26,114 26,114 26,114
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log bilateral trade (lnXijt) from country i to country j in year t.  RTA = reciprocal trade agreement. 
MA = mutual-agreement index.  AA = Asymmetric-agreement index.  All regressions are estimated using 5-year panel from 1975 to 2005 and 
include exporter-by-time, importer-by-time, and exporter-to-importer bilateral ﬁ  xed effects omitted in the table for brevity.  Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses.  ** denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.01 level. 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.17
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impact of mutual membership in RTAs increases bilateral agricultural trade 
105 percent, on average, beyond what would have occurred in the absence of 
these agreements when allowing for 10 years of phase-in effects.
Inspection of the empirical results from the various subsamples reveals that 
much of the agricultural trade expansion identiﬁ  ed in the global sample 
stemmed from mutual RTA membership between countries in the low-
income grouping. The payoff to agricultural LIC exporters belonging to the 
same RTA as their LIC partner was particularly pronounced, increasing 
1.5-fold, on average (table 5, column 8). This ﬁ  nding suggests that RTAs may 
be a particularly effective policy instrument, serving as a catalyst to more 
open agricultural markets in the developing world. 
Interestingly, there was no discernable increase in bilateral agricultural trade 
at mean values due to mutual RTA membership by either HIC exporters 
supplying afﬁ  liate LIC markets or by LIC exporters supplying afﬁ  liate HIC 
markets (columns 5 and 9). However, trade increased, on average, for HIC 
agricultural exporters supplying HIC markets when partners were members 
Table 5



























































































































Total MA effect 1.05 0.55 0.40 0.70 0.84 0.88 1.46
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.900 . 900 . 94 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.76 0.86
F-statistic 14.51 16.59 19.35 31.69 11.04 9.44 7.67 5.95 7.36
Root MSE 1.18 0.940 . 91 0.54 1.05 1.32 1.35 1.53 1.10
No. of observations  19,225 8,076 8,263 2,994 5,269 11,149 10,962 5,880 5,082
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of agricultural bilateral trade (lnXijt) from country i to country j in year t.  RTA = reciprocal trade 
agreement. MA = mutual-agreement index.  AA = asymmetric-agreement index.  HIC = high-income countries.  LIC = low-income countries.  
ALL = both high-income and low-income countries.  All regressions are estimated using 5-year panel data from 1975 to 2005 and include 
exporter-by-time, importer-by-time, and exporter-to-importer bilateral ﬁ  xed effects omitted in the table for brevity.  The “total MA effect” measures 
the percentage change in bilateral trade attributable to mutual membership in an RTA.  It is calculated when the MAijt sum is signiﬁ  cantly 
different than zero.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  They are calculated using White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors.  * and ** 
denote the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.18
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of the same RTA (column 4). This trade increase is 70 percent in the long 
run.
The rise in RTA-member agricultural exports to RTA-member partners came 
at the expense of trade with other agricultural suppliers. In the global sample, 
agricultural sales fell 49 percent, on average, for exporters supplying import 
partners afﬁ  liated with RTAs to which the exporters did not belong (table 6, 
column 1). When comparing subsample results (columns 2-9), agricultural 
trade contraction was the least, falling 24 percent in the long run, for an HIC 
supplier exporting to a country in the set of ALL importers (column 3).23 
23Similarly, agricultural trade 
creation was also the least for HICs 
exporting to the set of all importers, 
rising 40 percent.
Table 6




























































































































Total AA effect -0.49 -0.34 -0.24 -0.42 -0.39 -0.44 -0.57
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.900 . 900 . 94 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.76 0.86
F-statistic 14.46 16.54 19.35 32.02 11.10 9.43 7.66 5.95 7.34
Root MSE 1.18 0.940 . 91 0.54 1.05 1.32 1.35 1.53 1.10
No. of observations  19,225 8,076 8,263 2,994 5,269 11,149 10,962 5,880 5,082
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of agricultural bilateral trade (lnXijt) from country i to country j in year t.  RTA = reciprocal trade 
agreement. MA = mutual-agreement index.  AA = asymmetric-agreement index.  HIC = high-income countries.  LIC = low-income countries.  
ALL = both high-income and low-income countries.  All regressions are estimated using 5-year panel data from 1975 to 2005 and include 
exporter-by-time, importer-by-time, and exporter-to-importer bilateral ﬁ  xed effects omitted in the table for brevity.  The “total AA effect” measures 
the percentage change in bilateral trade attributable to mutual membership in an RTA.  It is calculated when the AAijt sum is signiﬁ  cantly 
different than zero.   Standard errors are in parentheses.  They are calculated using White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors.  * and ** 
denote the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.19
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Model Tradeoffs
RTAs are viewed by some analysts as a vehicle for government policymakers 
to use to circumvent domestic regulations in foreign countries by virtue 
of their ability to get “behind the border” and remove domestic barriers 
in foreign countries that inhibit partner trade. Lawrence (1996) posits, for 
instance, a link between the formation of RTAs and antitrust rules, product 
standards, corporate governance, tax codes, and internal shipping regulations. 
Yet such phenomena are not included in gravity equations because they are 
difﬁ  cult, if not impossible, to quantify. 
The absence of factors driving trade, such as domestic rules and regula-
tions, in our benchmark and sample-selection models may yield biased and 
inconsistent coefﬁ  cient estimates attributable to omitted variables. Errors-
in-variable bias arises when variables omitted in applied models are corre-
lated with both the dependent variable and one or more of the explanatory 
variables.  
The ﬁ  rst generalized model we estimate includes year, exporter-by-time, 
importer-by-time, and exporter-to-importer ﬁ  xed effects. Year dummies 
control for numerous factors, including inﬂ  ation common to all countries and 
the general increase in trade taking place due to globalization. The country-
by-time ﬁ  xed effects pick up domestic policies and country-speciﬁ  c macro-
economic shocks characterizing exporters and importers, as well as what 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) refer to as “multilateral resistances” that 
affect each trading partner. The exporter-to-importer ﬁ  xed effects control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, such as unique institutional linkages and political 
arrangements characterizing each country pair.
The empirical results show that gravity models that do not comprehensively 
account for heterogeneity, via the inclusion of appropriate ﬁ  xed effects, 
produce upwardly biased RTA coefﬁ  cients. Note, for example, parameter 
estimates for the statistically signiﬁ  cant RTA variables denoting MA and AA 
generated from the contemporaneous generalized gravity model are substan-
tially smaller (less than one-half) than corresponding coefﬁ  cients in either of 
the two conventional models.
The second generalized model we estimate is similar to the ﬁ  rst. It includes 
the same set of ﬁ  xed effects but also accounts for RTA lag effects. Empirical 
results indicate that the trade impacts of RTAs grow as producers and 
consumers adjust to policy-induced changes in the structure of markets and as 
the implementing provisions of these agreements are phased in over a period 
of 10 years. 
The shortcoming of the two generalized models is that the intensive use of 
ﬁ  xed effects sweeps away speciﬁ  c variables that trade theory identiﬁ  es as 
driving cross-border trade. Neither of the generalized models, for example, 
can accommodate the relative resource endowment variable. Thus, no tests 
can be performed to determine if the exporter/importer-to-land/labor ratio is 
statistically signiﬁ  cant. By contrast, both our benchmark and sample-selec-
tion models provide empirical evidence that relative factor endowment is an 
important driver of trade in agriculture, just as theory suggests.20
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Finally, we address concerns expressed in the literature about the possibility 
of bias in parameter estimates obtained from log-linear gravity models. The 
dependent variable in log-linear models is not really bilateral trade, but bilat-
eral trade contingent on a trading relationship because the log of zero is not 
deﬁ  ned. Our empirical results show that dropping missing and/or unreported 
trade, as is commonly done, generates modestly biased estimates for some 
independent variables, including that of MA and AA. Interestingly, the coef-
ﬁ  cients generated by the OLS models were virtually identical and of the same 
level of statistical signiﬁ  cance as those derived from the MLE models for the 
other explanatory variables (e.g., relative factor endowments).21
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Summary of Results
In this study, ERS examined the impact of reciprocal trade agreements on 
bilateral trade expansion and trade contraction in the world agricultural 
marketplace. We used a generic dummy variable to identify the inﬂ  uence on 
partner trade of mutual RTA membership. We innovated by developing and 
deploying a similarly constructed dummy variable, but one that is capable of 
detecting the inﬂ  uence of these agreements on trade between RTA member 
countries and their nonmember partners. 
Four types of gravity equations were estimated: a benchmark model, a 
Heckman sample-selection model, a generalized model focused on contem-
poraneous impacts, and a generalized model that accommodates RTA phase-
in effects. Model results provide empirical evidence that RTAs augment 
trade among and between countries mutually belonging to a common RTA, 
on average. We also ﬁ  nd evidence that this increase in trade comes at the 
expense of other suppliers. Imports of agricultural goods by countries that 
belong to RTAs typically fall from exporters who do not share a common 
RTA membership with their trading partner. Interestingly, results in each 
of the four types of models show that the percentage increase in bilateral 
trade attributable to mutual RTA membership is greater than the percentage 
decrease in partner trade due to asymmetric membership. 
Results from the benchmark models indicate that joint RTA membership, 
on average, boosts agricultural trade 93 percent in the long run, while the 
decrease in bilateral trade due to asymmetric membership is 46 percent. The 
Heckman sample-selection models depict somewhat lower longrun RTA 
impacts on bilateral trade. These models, which, unlike the OLS models, 
account for the absence of partner trade, show that membership in a common 
RTA generates 84 percent more agricultural trade between partner countries. 
Results also show that exports by countries supplying agricultural products 
to importers belonging to RTAs to which the exporter is not a member fall by 
43 percent. 
Our ﬁ  rst generalized model focuses exclusively on the contemporaneous 
effect of RTAs. It generates much smaller RTA impacts than either the bench-
mark or Heckman models. This is due to the generalized model’s compre-
hensive control of both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Empirical 
results from this generalized model show that mutual RTA membership 
increases bilateral trade by 34 percent in the long run, on average. The model 
also shows that asymmetric membership decreases agricultural trade by 26 
percent for countries importing from export suppliers not afﬁ  liated with an 
RTA to which the importer is a member. 
Our second generalized model accounts not only for the contemporaneous 
impact of RTAs but also for their lagged effects. In our view, this model 
generates the most accurate estimates of RTA-induced trade expansion and 
trade contraction. It allows for implementation of the free-trade provisions 
of RTAs to be phased in over a period of years. It also allows for the time 
often required for market participants to adjust their behavior to RTA-induced 
changes in market structure. 22
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The generalized model with phase-in effects estimates the 10-year cumula-
tive increase in agricultural exports to RTA partners to be 105 percent in the 
long run (on average), or triple the contemporaneous impact. The cumulative 
decrease in trade for an exporter supplying agricultural goods to an import 
partner afﬁ  liated with an RTA to which the exporter does not belong is esti-
mated to be 49 percent, almost double the contemporaneous impact of 26 
percent. These ﬁ  ndings demonstrate that the trade impacts of RTAs grow as 
producers and consumers adjust to policy-induced changes in the structure of 
markets.
Subsample estimations using the generalized gravity model with RTA phase-
in effects revealed that much of the agricultural trade expansion identiﬁ  ed in 
the global sample stemmed from mutual RTA membership between countries 
in the low-income grouping. The payoff was particularly pronounced when 
both partners were members of the same RTA, increasing 1.5-fold over the 
long run. This ﬁ  nding suggests that even though many policies in low-income 
countries continue to protect agriculture, RTAs are relatively effective instru-
ments in removing impediments to bilateral trade. It also indicates that RTAs 
may open markets that were previously closed or nearly closed within the 
developing world. Even a small increase in agricultural trade induced by the 
formation of an RTA between two low-income countries generates a large 
percentage change in trade when the previous level of trade between them 
was low.
Interestingly, there was no discernable increase in agricultural trade due to 
mutual RTA membership by either high-income country exporters supplying 
afﬁ  liate low-income country markets or by low-income country exporters 
supplying afﬁ  liate high-income country markets, on average. Many devel-
oping countries, nevertheless, place a high priority on forging trade agree-
ments with high-income countries rather than with low-income countries.
Policymakers may wish to think strategically when selecting partner coun-
tries with whom to form trade agreements. For example, a country is less 
likely to experience the adverse effects of import trade diversion when 
it chooses to form a trade alliance with countries whose exports are cost 
competitive with other foreign sources of supply. Similarly, a country is more 
likely to gain from export expansion by forging agreements with countries 
having high tariffs. The volume of cross-border trade is surely to grow with 
such countries as import levies are negotiated downward. 23
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Appendix: Economic Trade Theory and 
Advances in Applied Analyses
In the abstract world of neoclassical economics, relative price differentials 
provide incentives for cross-border trade that result in price convergence. 
However, given trade impediments such as transportation and other transac-
tion costs in the real world, trade and domestic price differentials can persist 
if transaction costs equal differences in production costs. To further empirical 
understanding about the forces underpinning bilateral trade ﬂ  ows, Tinbergen 
(1962) and Pöyhonen (1963) pioneered estimation of gravity equations. The 
basic model can be expressed as follows: 
Vij = f(Yi , Yj , Dij)          (1)
where Vij, the value of trade between countries i and j, is a positive function 
of Yi and Yj, the income (i.e., market size) of i and j, and a negative function 
of Dij, the distance separating the two trading partners signifying transaction 
costs of commercial activity. 
Many variations of the basic gravity model have been used in the literature to 
examine the factors hypothesized to drive product specialization and trade. 
Modiﬁ  ed equations often include variables denoting speciﬁ  c supply condi-
tions at the origin (e.g., factor endowments, technology), additional demand 
conditions at the destination (e.g., per capita income), and/or numerous 
economic forces that either assist or resist the movement of bilateral trade 
(e.g., colonial linkages, trade agreements). 
Applied gravity analyses fell out of favor for a number of years due to data 
and statistical problems as well as to concerns about the absence of clear 
linkages to economic trade theory. Recent contributions in the theoretical and 
applied literature have, however, enhanced credibility and sparked a revival in 
gravity-based research.
A number of studies have strengthened microeconomic foundations. 
Deardorff (1998) addresses whether gravity models can work in the neoclas-
sical world. He shows that the gravity equations are able to accommodate 
both the perfectly competitive Heckscher-Ohlin model and the monopolistic-
competitive model of Dixit-Stiglitz (1977). Feenstra et al. (2001) develop a 
national (Armington) product and a monopolistic competition model, both 
of which include transaction costs. They conclude that a wider range of theo-
ries than previously recognized is consistent with the gravity-type equation. 
Evenett and Keller (2002) demonstrate that the gravity framework can be 
used to test for increasing-returns-to-scale and relative-factor-endowment 
explanations of trade under conditions of perfect and imperfect specialization. 
Eaton and Kortum (2002) derive a gravity model from the Ricardian theory 
of international trade. A recent contribution to this literature is the work of 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004). They developed an analytical 
framework that establishes linkages between trade theory, in which p  rices 
play a central equilibrating role, and the generalized gravity model. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW) manipulate the constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) expenditure system to derive an operational model based 29
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upon trade costs. Market-clearing conditions are imposed to solve for general-
equilibrium prices, prices that embody bilateral resistances confronting both 
the exporter and the importer with all of their trading partners. The most 
important insight obtained from their gravity model is that bilateral trade 
depends not only on the bilateral drivers, such as distance, characterizing 
the joint partnership of i and j, but also on multilateral drivers confronting 
exporter i and importer j in their other markets.  
The generalized gravity equation that emerges from AvW’s framework is 
consistent with economic theory:
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) (1 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )                (2) ij i j w ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) (1 ) ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) (1 ) ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ⎡⎤ l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) l( ) l( )l ()l ( ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) (1 ) ) ln( ) ln( ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) (1 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) (1 ) )l n ( ) ln( ) ln( ln( ) ln( ) ⎣⎦ ) ij i j () ( ) ( )( )( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )l n ()l n ( ln( ) ln( ) ln( )l n ()l n ( ln( ln( ) ln( ) )l n ( ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) )l n ( )l n (
where Xij is the value of exports from i to j; Yi, Yj, and Yw are the outputs of 
country i, j, and the world (w), respectively; σ is the elasticity of substitution 
between the countries’ goods; TIij represents trade impediments; Pi captures 
“outward multilateral resistances” that depict the average trade resistance 
between origin i and its importing partner; Pj embodies “inward multilateral 
resistances” that represent destination j’s average trade resistance with its 
supplying partners; and the θs denote income shares. 
Fixed-effects statistical models can account for unobservable omitted vari-
ables (Feenstra, 2003). Given that the ﬁ  xed-effects models are computation-
ally easier to estimate than customized nonlinear least squares (NLS) models, 
most applied researchers have adopted the least squares dummy variables 
(LSDV) approach to estimating generalized gravity equations. The prototype 
model of the LSDV-type is as follows:24  
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m
β ln( ) ln( )
m
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where the ﬁ  xed effects (γi) and (γj) control for multilateral prices, each 
m
ij TIi  
represents a proxy vector denoting bilateral trade costs and εij refers to the 
disturbance term.25   
Recent developments in the applied literature have advanced gravity analyses 
by addressing statistical issues that had led to model misspeciﬁ  cation and 
incorrect interpretation of empirical results in the early years. Mátyás (1997) 
and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) have shown that proper use of ﬁ  xed effects 
can correct for omitted variables. Mátyás maintains that gravity models that 
test the signiﬁ  cance of trading blocs are misspeciﬁ  ed unless they are speci-
ﬁ  ed as a triple-index model that accounts for exporter, importer, and time 
ﬁ  xed effects. Egger and Pfaffermayr assert that proper speciﬁ  cation of the 
gravity equation includes, in addition to Mátyás’s three indexes, bilateral 
ﬁ  xed effects. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) present a case for using country-
by-time and country-pair ﬁ  xed effects in a theoretically motivated gravity 
equation. Baldwin (2006) recommends ignoring gravity results that do not 
comprehensively control for such heterogeneity.
24The term – ln(Yw) is common 
across all countries and is therefore 
captured through a constant in the 
regression model.  The term ln(Yi) – 
ln(Pi) is constant across all exporters 
for a given importer.  It is captured by 
the exporter dummy, (δi). The term 
ln(Yi) – ln(Pi) is constant across all 
importers for a given exporter.  It is 
captured through the importer dummy, 
(δj).
25The “trade costs” for exogenous 
factor m is  ) mm ρβ σ /( 1 ) mm β /( 1 , where is 
the substitution elasticity.